Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: Exercise in Futility or a Teachable Moment? by Russo, Charles J.
University of Dayton
eCommons
Educational Leadership Faculty Publications Department of Educational Leadership
Winter 1999
Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies:
Exercise in Futility or a Teachable Moment?
Charles J. Russo
University of Dayton, crusso1@udayton.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.udayton.edu/eda_fac_pub
Part of the Education Law Commons, Religion Law Commons, and the Secondary Education
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Educational Leadership at eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Educational Leadership Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of eCommons. For more information, please contact
frice1@udayton.edu, mschlangen1@udayton.edu.
eCommons Citation
Russo, Charles J., "Prayer at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: Exercise in Futility or a Teachable Moment?" (1999). Educational
Leadership Faculty Publications. 130.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/eda_fac_pub/130
PRAYER AT PUBLIC SCHOOL GRADUATION 
CEREMONIES: AN EXERCISE IN FUTILITY OR A 
TEACHABLE MOMENT?· 
Charles J. Russo·· 
INTRODUCTION 
One has only to look at the strife in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Northern Ireland, and the Middle East to recognize how volatile 
and violent religious differences within a society can become. 1 As 
litigious as the United States has become over religion in the 
marketplace of ideas, particularly in public schools, the Nation 
is indeed fortunate that disputes have managed to remain non-
violent. 
A major impetus for the founding of the American colonies 
was the desire of many to escape the tyranny of state-sponsored 
religions in Western Europe during the upheaval of the post-
Reformation era, so it is ironic that many of the practices they 
sought to avoid were transplanted into the New World. Conse-
quently, the sense of frustration experienced by many of those 
who helped create the new American Republic gave birth to the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment. The Framers of the 
Bill of Rights were concerned with prohibiting the establishment 
of a state-sponsored religion. At the same time, the Framers did 
not wish to inhibit the free exercise of religion; hence the poten-
Although not attributed to a particular author, the "teachable moment" is a 
term of art that refers to a time when "conditions for learning ar~ optimum." CARTER v. 
GOOD (Ed.), DICTIONARY OF EDUCATION 586 (3d ed. 1973). 
** Professor, Department of Educational Administration, School of Education, and 
Fellow, Center for International Programs, University of Dayton. B.A., 1972, St. John's 
University; M. Div., 1978, Seminary of the Immaculate Conception; J.D., 1983, St. 
John's University; Ed.D., 1989, St. John's University. 
1. For a first hand account of the author's experiences in, and reflections on, 
post-war Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Charles J. Russo, At the Table in 
Sarajevo: Reflections on Ethnic Segregation in Bosnia, 38 CATH. LAW. 211 (1998). 
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tial for antagonism between the two religion clauses in the First 
Amendment. 2 
The United States Supreme Court is heir to this historic 
frustration. As the final arbiter in the conflict between values in 
a First Amendment dispute, the United States Supreme Court is 
often in a "catch 22" situation. That is, while the Court seeks to 
adhere to religious neutrality, its rulings are often perceived by 
critics at both ends of the spectrum as anything but neutral. 3 
Appeals to history as to the meaning of the religion clauses 
as intended by the Founding Fathers fail to provide clear an-
swers. This lack of clarity stems largely from the fact that close 
ties between religion and government continued in several 
states even after the adoption of the Bill of Rights. 4 As a result 
of the paradox created by the mandated separation of a symbi-
otic relationship, the natural tension between the religion 
clauses generates a similar rivalry between supporters of the 
two distinct approaches to the First Amendment's religion 
clauses.5 On the one hand are supporters of the Jeffersonian 
2. For background information, see generally LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND 
FREEDOM (revised edition 1967); RELIGION AND THE STATE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF LEO 
PFEFFER (James L. Wood, Jr., ed. 1985); LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE 
FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION (1988); RELIGION AND POLITICS: FROM THE COLONIAL PERIOD TO 
THE 1980s (Mark A. Noll, ed. 1990). 
3. The Court is ordinarily the final arbiter of such disagreements. However, 
tension continues to surround disagreements between the Court and other branches of 
the government. Perhaps the best recent example of this tension began in Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), 
wherein the Court upheld the dismissal of two Native American drug counselors for 
ingesting peyote, a sacrament in the Native American Church. For a discussion of this 
case, See David L. Gregory & Charles J. Russo, Let Us Pray (but not them!): The 
Troubled Jurisprudence of Religious Liberty, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 273 (1991). 
Subsequently, Congress essentially overruled Smith by passing the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-(4) (1993) while restoring greater 
protection for religious liberty. However, the Court struck the Act down in City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). For a discussion of Boerne, see 
Ralph D. Mawdsley, Invalidating the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Implications 
for Religious Liberty, 123 EDUC. L. REP. 431 (1998). 
4. Up until at least until the time of the Revolutionary War, "[T]here . . were 
established churches in at least eight of the thirteen former colonies and established 
religions in at least four of the other five." Engele v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428 n. 5 
(1962). For a review of the background, see generally Richard Hoskins, The Original 
Separation of Church and State in America, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 221 (1984); Kent 
Greenwalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352 (1985). 
5. For discussions of these tensions, see, e.g., 4 Rotunda & Nowak, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE, 446 (2d ed. 1992; pocket parts 1998) 
446; Michael W. McConnell, Neutrality Under the Religion Clauses, 81 Nw. U. L.REV. 
146 (1986); Mark V. Tushnet, Religion and Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 
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metaphor of maintaining a "wall of separation" between church 
and state.6 This wall of separation is most often associated with 
the Supreme Court over the past thirty-five years. 7 On the other 
hand are those, including the Christian Right, who favor accom-
modation to religion as long as no one religion is supported or 
favored to the exclusion of others.8 
Public education presents today's Court with one of its great-
est challenges as it interprets the religion clauses.9 Although the 
33 LOY. L. REV. 221 (1987); John H. Garvey, The Architecture of the Establishment 
Clause, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1451 (1997). 
6. The metaphor of the "wall of separation" comes from Thomas Jefferson's letter 
of January 1, 1802 to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, A 
Committee of the Danbury Baptist Association. 16 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281 
(Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed., 1903). Jefferson wrote: 
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his 
God ... I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American 
people which declared that their legislature should "make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," thus building a 
wall of separation between church and state. 
The term was first used by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 164 (1879) (a case involving a Mormon's Free Exercise Clause challenge to a 
federal polygamy statute)). 
7. Members of the Court have had widely different perspectives on the "wall." 
For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38, 107 
(1985), soundly criticized the wall. He wrote that the wall "[i]s ... a metaphor based 
on bad history, a metaphor which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should 
be frankly and explicitly abandoned." For a review of Wallace, see discussion at note 40 
and accompanying text. But see Justice Brennan's concurrence in which Justice 
Blackmun joins in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (upholding the display 
of a creche among secular symbols) at 673: "The concept of a 'wall' of separation is a 
useful figure of speech .... " The viability of the wall continues to be debated. See, 
e.g., Martha M. McCarthy, Is the Wall of Separation Still Standing, 77 EDUC. L. REP. 
1 (1992). 
8. For representative commentaries on this issue, see Michael W. McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion, 1985 SUPREME COURT REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell, 
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. 
Rev. 685 (1992); Ralph D. Mawdsley, The Advancement-Accommodation of Religion 
Continuum: Searching for the Mythical Midpoint, 117 EDUC. L. REP. 21 (1997); Richard 
S. Vacca,et H.C. al.Hudgins, & Louis M. Millhouse, Accommodation of Religion Without 
Establishment of Religion, 115 EDUC. L. REP. 9 (1997). 
9. The Court is certainly more overtly polarized over abortion. See, e.g., Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming a woman's 
ability to chose to have an abortion prior to fetal viability); Webster v. Reproductive 
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (holding that a statute barring the use of public 
funds for the performance or assistance of non-therapeutic abortions did not contravene 
the Constitution); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a Texas criminal 
statute that prohibited abortion at any time other than to save the life of the mother 
and defining a woman's "right" to have an abortion). However, when turning to 
education, the Court has, over the past twenty years, addressed more school cases on 
religion than any other topic, even desegregation. 
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earliest European settlers traveled to America in search of reli-
gious freedom, their understanding of the relationship among 
religion, government, and education was unlike our contempo-
rary perspective. The notion of public education divorced from 
denominational control was foreign to the colonial mind. The 
lack of a clear distinction between church and state sowed the 
seeds for contemporary debates-especially as church and state 
intersected in the schools. The absence of a definitive interpreta-
tion of the First Amendment makes it difficult to find the bal-
ance that allows the religion clauses and public education to 
maintain their integrity. 
Due to conflicting lower court judgments on the propriety of 
prayer at public school graduation ceremonies, this question will 
return to the Supreme Court. 10 This article is divided into three 
major sections. Part I briefly recites the history of the Establish-
ment Clause and education. Part II examines case law relevant 
to prayer at public school graduation ceremonies. This section 
begins with a brief examination of the cases prior to Lee. 11 It 
next reviews the majority and dissenting opinions in Lee in some 
detail to show how the diametrically opposed views of Justices 
Kennedy ofthe majority and Scalia of the dissent have helped to 
shape the parameters of post-Lee debate. Part II also discusses 
the tests employed by the Supreme Court and lower courts in 
evaluating school-sponsored prayer or religious activity. This 
section ends with a brief review of post-Lee lower court cases. 
Part III discusses questions related to how prayer at public 
school graduation ceremonies can be transformed into a teach-
able moment that allows all those gathered to develop a new 
sense of respect for an opinion other than their own. Part IV 
concludes that by permitting prayer at public school graduation 
ceremonies, the Supreme Court does not run the risk of estab-
lishing a state-sponsored religion; instead it leads the way in 
fostering a climate wherein divergent opinions are appreciated 
and even celebrated. 
I. HISTORY OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND EDUCATION 
Judicial interpretation of the Establishment Clause, espe-
cially with regard to religion and education, has a short history. 
10. See infra, note 71 and accompanying text. 
11. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
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Prior to the Court's 194 7 ruling in Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion, 12 the few cases involving religion, however broadly con-
strued, and public education were decided on grounds other 
than the Establishment Clause.13 From Everson through the 
early 1990s, the Court's interpretations ofboth federal and state 
actions have generally maintained that the Establishment 
Clause prohibits governmental sponsorship of or aid to any reli-
gion. 14 Yet, given the conservative coalition that emerges when 
the swing Justices, Kennedy and O'Connor/5 join the conserva-
tive core of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and 
Thomas, the Court's attitude on aid has been altered dramati-
cally.16 
Notwithstanding the shift in the Court's stance with regard 
to aid, there has been little change in its attitude toward prayer 
in the schools. The Court's intransigence is highlighted in Lee v. 
Weisman, 17 where the majority held that school-sponsored 
prayer at public high school graduation ceremonies violates the 
Establishment Clause. 18 
12. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding the constitutionality of a state law from New 
Jersey that reimbursed the transportation costs of parents who sent their children to 
non-public schools). 
13. The leading cases are Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding 
that Oregon's compulsory attendance law, which required all students to attend public 
schools, violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause), and Cochran v. 
Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) (holding that a state law providing 
textbooks to students in non-public schools did not violate the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
14. The Child Benefit test, which traces its origins to Everson, supra note 10, is 
based on the premise that under certain circumstances, aid is provided primarily to 
students and not the religiously affiliated schools that they attend. After being largely 
ignored during the Lemon era, the Court reinvigorated the Child Benefit test in Zobrest 
v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (permitting a sign language 
interpreter to provide services on site in a religiously affiliated high school on the 
ground that since the student was the primary beneficiary, any aid that the school 
received was incidental), and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997) 
(holding that employees in a Title I program that provided remedial services on site in 
religiously-affiliated non-public schools to students who were educationally and 
economically disadvantaged is barred by the Establishment Clause). 
15. Justice Kennedy who wrote, and Justice O'Connor, who joined, the majority 
opinion in Lee are still considered moderates, at least in religion cases, in light of their 
stance in aid cases. 
16. The two most notable cases here are Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 
509 U.S. 1 (1993) and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997), supra, 
note 14. 
17. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
18. For a case from higher education, see Tanford v. Brand, 104 F.3d 982 (7th Cir. 
1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 60 (1997) (permitting an invocation and benediction at 
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II. SCHOOL SPONSORED PRAYER OR RELATED ACTIVITY 
A. SUPREME COURT CASES PRIOR TO LEE 
Shortly after the New York State Board of Regents recom-
mended and composed a prayer to be used at the start of the day 
in public schools, the parents of ten students filed suit in state 
court arguing that the use of official prayer was contrary to their 
own religious beliefs and those of their children. In Engel v. 
Vitale, the first case in which the Supreme Court considered the 
propriety of prayers in schools, the Court agreed that the Board 
of Regents violated the Establishment Clause even though stu-
dents could have been excused from participation. 19 The Court 
found that governmental involvement in creating the prayer 
was dangerously close to the official establishment of religion 
that many of the Framers sought to avoid-especially since the 
prayer was recited in schools.20 
Faced with a growing controversy over its ruling in Engel, 
the Court again found itself in the eye of a storm regarding the 
companion cases of School District of Abington Township v. 
Schempp and Murray v. Curlett. 21 Here the Court was asked to 
address the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute and a 
Maryland rule adopted pursuant to a state law that required 
Bible reading and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer at the start of 
the day in public schools.22 More specifically, in Schempp a state 
law required a student to read at least ten verses from the Bible 
over the school intercom, without comment, followed by the 
a university commencement on the grounds that college students were less 
impressionable than students in K-12 settings and that the 155-year practice of having 
a nonsectarian invocation and benediction at commencement did not violate the 
Establishment Clause). For a discussion of prayer at commencement exercises in higher 
education, see W. Bradley Colwell & Paul W. Thurston, Prayer and University 
Commencement: Application of Lee v. Weisman, 94 Enuc. L. REP. 1 (1994). 
19. 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
20. Shortly after classes completed the Pledge of Allegiance, each teacher chose 
a student to recite the following prayer "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence 
upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our 
Country." ld. at 422. 
21. 374 u.s. 203 (1963). 
22. Although the question has apparently not been raised previously, it is worth 
noting that while most Christians who belong to Protestant Church's use this title for 
the words of Jesus, Roman Catholics refer to this same prayer as the "Our Father." It 
would have been interesting to see what would have happened if Catholics raised this 
objection. 
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recitation of the Lord's prayer at the opening of each public 
school day. 23 In Murray, the Board of School Commissioners in 
the City of Baltimore adopted a rule pursuant to state law that 
called for the daily reading of a chapter from the Bible without 
comment and recitation ofthe Lord's Prayer. In both cases, chil-
dren could be excused from taking part in these activities upon 
the written requests oftheir parents or guardians. 
Schempp introduced a new era in the relationship between 
religion and government. The Court enunciated a two-part test 
to invalidate both practices and, in so doing, vitiated both prac-
tices. Even though neither state was directly involved in the 
composition of the prayers, students participated voluntarily, 
and no one religion was favored. Justice Clark's majority opin-
ion maintained that "The test may be stated as follows: what 
are the purpose and the primary effect of the [legislative] enact-
ment? ... [T]o withstand the strictures of the Establishment 
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a pri-
mary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."24 The 
Court quickly added that nothing in its decision excluded the 
secular study of the Bible in public schools when in connection 
with topics such as comparative religion, literature, or history. 
The Court was soon faced with yet another dispute involving 
the Establishment Clause. 25 In Lemon u. Kurtzman, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of programs from Rhode Island 
and Pennsylvania that aided religiously affiliated non-public 
schools. 26 The case from Rhode Island centered on a state statute 
that paid salary supplements to certified teachers in non-public 
schools who taught only subjects that were offered in the public 
schools. Similarly, the action from Pennsylvania involved a state 
law that provided reimbursements for teachers' salaries, text-
books, and instructional materials for courses as long as they 
23. The school provided only copies of the King James Bible. Even so, students 
used the Douay and Standard versions as well as Jewish Scriptures. 374 U.S. 203, 207 
(1963). 
24. ld. at 222. 
25. In the interim, the Court applied the Purpose and Effects test in Board of 
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). The Court's upholding a New York State law that 
required school boards to loan textbooks for secular subjects to all students regardless 
of whether they attended public or non-public schools, is generally accepted as 
representing the outer limit of permissible aid to religiously affiliated non-public 
schools. 
26. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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did not contain "any subject matter expressing religious teach-
ing, or the morals or forms of worship of any sect."27 
Invalidating both programs, the Court subsequently added a 
third element, from Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City, 28 
to create the tripartite test that it has since relied upon in virtu-
ally all cases involving the Establishment Clause. 29 Chief Jus-
tice Burger's majority opinion in Lemon stated that: 
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of 
the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many 
years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, 
the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its 
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances 
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an 
excessive government entanglement30 with religion."31 
Even though the first two parts of the seemingly ubiquitous and 
increasingly unworkable Lemon tesf32 were developed in the 
context of prayer cases, it continues to be applied just as widely 
in disputes involving aid to non-public schools.33 
27. Id. at 610. 
28. 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (upholding New York State's practice of providing state 
property tax exemptions for church property that is used in worship services). 
29. As central as Lemon has been, it was conspicuous by its absence in Justice 
Kennedy's opinion in Lee. 
30. When addressing entanglement and state aid to institutions that are 
religiously affiliated, Chief Justice Burger noted that the Court took three additional 
factors into consideration: "we must examine the character and purposes of the 
institutions that are benefitted, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the 
resulting relationship between the government and religious authority." Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971). 
31. Id. at 612-613 (internal citations omitted). (Citations omitted). 
32. The Lemon test continues to generate grist for the academic mill. See, e.g., 
Carl H. Esbeck, The Lemon Test: Should it be Retained, Reformulated or Rejected? 4 
NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL 'y 513 (1990); Timothy V. Franklin, Squeezing the 
Juice Out of the Lemon Test, 72 Enuc. L. REP. 1 (1992); Michael S. Paulsen, Lemon is 
Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795 (1993); Daniel 0. Conkle, Discussion of Lemon is 
Dead, 43 CASE. W. RES. L. REV. 865 (1993); Julie K. Underwood & Julie F. Mead, 
Establishment of Religion Analysis: The Lemon Test or Just Lemonade? 25 J.L. & Enuc. 
55 (1996). 
33. In addition to other cases cited in the footnotes, see, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 
421 U.S. 349 (1975) (upholding text book loans; striking down the loan of instructional 
equipment such as laboratory materials and maps); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 
(1977) (upholding text book loans, the delivery of diagnostic services, and the off-site 
deliver of etherapeutic services; striking down loans of instructional materials and the 
use of buses for field trips for students in religiously-affiliated non public schools). 
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As the Court has grown increasingly dissatisfied with 
Lemon, Justices O'Connor and Kennedy have offered their own 
alternatives. In Lynch v. Donnelly,34 a non-school case in which 
the Court upheld the display of a creche among secular symbols, 
Justice O'Connor's concurrence sought to modifY Lemon by cre-
ating a two-part test: 
The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making 
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's 
standing in the political community. Government can run 
afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways. One is exces-
sive entanglement with religious institutions, which may in-
terfere with the independence of the institutions, give the 
institutions access to government or governmental powers not 
fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the 
creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines 
(internal citations omitted). The second and more direct in-
fringement is government endorsement or disapproval of reli-
gion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they 
are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and 
an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, 
favored members of the political community. Disapproval 
sends the opposite message. 35 
In further explaining her stance on the governmental endorse-
ment of religion, Justice O'Connor called for modifications to 
both the purpose and effect tests in Lemon: 
The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether govern-
ment's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. 
The effect prong asks whether, irrespective of government's 
actual purpose, the practice under review in fact conveys a 
message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative answer 
to either question should render the challenged practice in-
valid.3r; 
34. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
35. !d. at 687-688. (O'Connor concurring). 
36. !d. at 690. 
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Even though Justice O'Connor's endorsement tese7 has been 
used frequently, 38 it has yet to replace Lemon.39 
As state legislatures sought to circumvent the Court's ban on 
school-sponsored prayer and religious activity,40 laws mandating 
or permitting moments of silence emerged. 41 Wallace v. Jaffree42 
was the first such case to make its way to the Supreme Court. 
Here an Alabama statute originally providing for a moment of 
silent meditation was amended to include voluntary prayer. In 
the only case where the Court found it unnecessary to proceed 
beyond Lemon's first prong, the Court decided that the law vio-
lated the Establishment Clause because the legislature was 
motivated solely by the religious purpose of returning organized 
37. For a more complete discussion of this test, see Julie K. Underwood, 
Establishment of Religion in Primary and Secondary Schools, 55 EDUC. L. REP. 807 
(1989). 
38. Even though Lynch was formulated in a context other than education, the 
Court applied it in the next four cases involving the Establishment Clause in disputes 
surrounding K-12 education. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1982) (striking 
down a state law requiring balanced treatment of creation science and evolution as 
violating the Establishment Clause); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (striking 
down the on-site delivery of Title I services in religiously affiliated non-public schools); 
Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (striking down a program that provided 
publicly-funded education for students in religiously affiliated non public schools); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) see discussion at, infra, note 43 and 
accompanying text. Surprisingly, the test was ignored in subsequent cases not involving 
education. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding the Adolescent 
Family Life Act even though it aided public and non-public organizations that provided 
services related to the care of pregnant adolescents and the prevention of sexual 
relationships in this age group); Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church v. Amos, 
483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding a statutory amendment for religious organizations from 
the prohibition against discrimination in employment on the basis of religion); Witters 
v. Washington Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) (holding that a vocational 
rehabilitation program that provided assistance to a blind student as he studies for the 
religious ministry did not violate the Establishment Clause since he, not his college, 
was the primary beneficiary). 
39. For a more complete discussion of Justice Kennedy's (psychological) coercion 
test from Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), see infra discussion at, infra, note 56 
and accompanying text. 
40. In Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980), reh'g denied. 449 U.S. 1104 (1981), 
remanded, 612 S.W.2d 133 (Ky. 1981), the Supreme Court struck down, without the 
benefit of oral argument, a statute from Kentucky that required the posting of the Ten 
Commandments on a wall of each public classroom in the Commonwealth on the ground 
that it violated the Establishment Clause. 
41. The Court has held firm against prayer in the schools but not other arenas. 
Perhaps the most notable case in this regard is Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 
(1983) (upholding the Nebraska legislature's practice of hiring a religious chaplain to 
open each legislative day with a prayer). 
42. 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
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prayer to the public schools. 43 As such, the Court struck the law 
down since it clearly intended to characterize prayer as a fa-
vored practice. 
In Karcher v. May,44 the only other case involving a moment 
of silence to reach the Supreme Court,45 the Justices avoided 
reaching a judgment on the merits. 46 The Court ruled that the 
appellants, former leaders of the New Jersey State Assembly 
and Senate who lost their leadership positions, lacked standing 
to appeal the Third Circuit's decision upholding a ruling that 
the statute permitting a moment of silence was unconstitu-
tional. 
43. If ever there was a smoking gun, State Senator Donald G. Holmes, prime 
sponsor of the bill provided one. He testified that the law "was an 'effort to return 
voluntary prayer to our public schools ... it is a beginning and a step in the right 
direction.' Apart from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to public school, [he) 
unequivocally testified that he had 'no other purpose in mind'" when he introduced the 
bill. ld. at 43. 
44. 484 U.S. 72 (1987). For a discussion of this case, see Steven S. Goldberg, The 
Supreme Court Remains Silent on Moments of Silence: Karcher v. May, 43 Enuc. L. REP. 
849 (1988). 
45. More recently, a teacher in Georgia unsuccessfully challenged a state law that 
permits a moment of quiet reflection in public schools. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed 
that the law satisfied the Lemon test. Bown v. Gwinnett County Sch. Dist., 112 F.3d 
1464 (11th Cir. 1997). See also Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 950 F. Supp. 1337 
(N.D. Ohio 1996) (upholding a board's practice of opening its meetings with a prayer 
or a moment of silence on the ground that since the board meeting was fundamentally 
an adult atmosphere, prayer did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
46. Five courts, in six different cases, had earlier held that religious activities in 
the morning did not violate state constitutions. Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (Me. 
1854); McCormick v. Burt, 95 Ill. 263 (Ill. 1880); Moore v. Monroe, 20 N.W. 475 (Iowa 
1884); Billard v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 76 P. 422 (Kan. 1904); Hackett v. 
Brooksville Graded Sch. Dist., 87 S.W. 792 (Ky. 1905); Knowlton v. Baumhover, 166 
N.W. 202 (Iowa 1918). However, at least five courts, including Illinois, which had 
previously decided to the contrary, held that religious exercise violated their 
constitutions. See State ex rei. Weiss v. District Bd., 44 N.W. 967 (Wis. 1890); Freeman 
v. Scheve, 91 N.W. 846 (Neb. 1902); People ex rei. Ring v. Board of Educ. of Dist. 24, 
92 N.E. 251 (Ill. 1910); Herold v. Parish Bd. of Sch. Directors, 68 So. 116 (La. 1915); 
State ex rei. Finger v. Weedman, 226 N.W. 348 (S.D. 1929). 
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B. LEE V. WEISMAN 
The Court47 finally agreed to hear a case on the merits of 
graduation prayer48 in Lee u. Wiesman~9 Based on the school 
system's policy of inviting religious leaders to pray at graduation 
ceremonies, administrators in Providence, Rhode Island, asked a 
rabbi to offer non-sectarian prayers which followed the guide-
lines prepared by the National Conference of Christians and 
Jews. Even so, a student and her father unsuccessfully sought to 
prevent the rabbi from offering the prayers.50 Subse-
47. Prior to Lee, other courts during the Lemon era had already prohibited prayer 
at graduation ceremonies. Graham v. Central Community Sch. Dist. of Decatur County, 
608 F. Supp. 531 (D. Ia. 1985); Kay v. David Douglas Sch. Dist. No. 40, 719 P.2d 875 
(Or. Ct. App. 1986); Bennett v. Livermore Unified Sch. Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 819 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1987); Lundberg v. West Monona Community Sch. Dist., 731 F. Supp. 331 
(N.D. Iowa 1989); Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 281 Cal. Rptr. 34 (Cal. 1991). 
48. Earlier, the Eleventh Circuit banned prayer prior to the start of public school 
football games, Jager v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 862 F.2d 824 (11th Cir. 1989), cert. 
denied, 490 U.S. 1090 (1989). See also Steele v. Van Buren Pub. Sch. Dist., 845 F.2d 
1492 (8th Cir. 1988) (prohibiting a high school band teacher from leading the band in 
prayer at mandatory rehearsals and performances); Doe v. Aldine Indep. Sch. Dist., 563 
F. Sup. 883 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding that recitation of an expressly Christian prayer 
initiated by the principal or other school employee at athletic contests and pep rallies 
violated the Establishment Clause). 
49. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
50. Rabbi Gutterman's prayers were: 
INVOCATION: "God of the Free, Hope of the Brave: For the legacy of 
America where diversity is celebrated and the rights of minorities are 
protected, we thank You. May these young men and women grow up to 
enrich it. For the liberty of America, we thank You. May these new 
graduates grow up to guard it. For the political process of America in which 
all its citizens may participate, for its court system where all may seek 
justice we thank You. May those we honor this morning always turn to it 
in trust. For the destiny of America we thank You. May the graduates of 
Nathan Bishop Middle School so live that they might help to share it. May 
our aspirations for our country and for these young people, who are our 
hope for the future, be richly fulfilled. AMEN." 
BENEDICTION: "0 God, we are grateful to You for having endowed us with 
the capacity for learning which we have celebrated on this joyous 
commencement. Happy families give thanks for seeing their children achieve 
an important milestone. Send Your blessings upon the teachers and 
administrators who helped prepare them. The graduates now need strength 
and guidance for the future, help them to understand that we are not 
complete with academic knowledge alone. We must each strive to fulfill 
what You require of us all: To do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly. We 
give thanks to You, Lord, for keeping us alive, sustaining us and allowing 
us to reach this special, happy occasion. AMEN." Lee at 581-582. "God" 
appears twice and "lord" once in the 252 words of prayer. However, Justice 
Blackmun's concurrence noted that the phrase in the Benediction, ''We must 
each strive to fulfill what you require of us all, to do justly, to love mercy, 
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quently, the federal trial court permanently enjoined the district 
from permitting prayer at graduation ceremonies on the grounds 
that doing so violated the effect prong of Lemon by creating a 
symbolic union between religion and the government.51 The 
First Circuit affirmed even though the judge who wrote the ma-
jority opinion thought it unnecessary to expand on the trial 
court's analysis. 52 
The Supreme Court's willingness to hear the appeal in Lee 
was greeted with great anticipation for two reasons. 53 First, it 
was the first time that the Court would directly address the 
issue of graduation prayer. Second, since a majority of the jus-
tices sitting in the Lee decision had expressed their dissatisfac-
tion with the Lemon test, there was the sense that Lee might 
result in an alternative test. 54 
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion striking down school-
sponsored prayer in the Court's bitterly divided 5-4 ruling55 
surprised most observers since it virtually ignored Lemon.56 
Kennedy found it unnecessary "to revisit the difficult ... ques-
tions of the definition and full scope of the principles governing 
the extent of permitted accommodation by the State for the reli-
gious beliefs and practices of many of its citizens."57 His opinion, 
to walk humbly" conveys a Judea-Christian message that was clearly 
borrowed from the Prophet Micah at Chapter 6, verse 8. (Blackmun, J., 
concurring), at 604 note604 n. 5. Similarly, Justice Souter's concurrence 
feared that the reference from Micah "embodies a straightforwardly theistic 
premise" (Souter, J., concurring), at 617617. 
51. Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68 (D.R.I. 1990). 
52. Weisman v. Lee, 908 F.2d 1090 1090 (1st Cir. 1990). 
53. Cert. granted, 499 U.S. 918 (1991). 
54. Prior to Lee, a majority of the Court was on record as being less than pleased 
with Lemon. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia favored rejecting 
Lemon; Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Blackmun favored modifying the test. Only 
Justices Marshall and Stevens were willing to retain Lemon without any modifications. 
For a full discussion of the Justices' perspectives at that time, see Ralph D. Mawdsley 
& Charles J. Russo, High School Prayers at Graduation: Will The Supreme Court 
Pronounce the Benediction? 69 EDUC. L. REP. 26 (1991). 
55. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun, Stevens, 
O'Connor, and Souter. Justices Blackmun and Souter filed concurring opinions. Justice 
Souter's opinion was joined by Justices Stevens and O'Connor. Justice Scalia's dissent 
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Thomas. 
56. For a full discussion of the case, see Ralph D. Mawdsley & Charles J. Russo, 
Lee v. Weisman: The Supreme Court Pronounces the Benediction on Public School 
Graduation Prayers. 77 EDUC. L. REP. 1071 (1992). For a different interpretation, see 
David Schimmel, Graduation Prayers Flunh Coercion Test: An Analysis uf Lee u. 
Weisman. 76 EDUC. L. REP. 913 (1992). 
57. Lee v. Weisman, supra, note 49, at 586. 
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which was not organized around clearly identified concepts, 
focused on two constitutional points. Namely, he examined the 
relationships between the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses on the one hand, and the Free Speech and Establish-
ment Clauses on the other. 
Justice Kennedy's view of the relationship between the Free 
Exercise and Establishment Clauses is reflected in his state-
ment that "[t]he principle that government may accommodate 
the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental 
limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause."58 He found 
that there were three key factors in this regard: coerciveness, 
potential for divisiveness, and the place of civic religion. 
Kennedy offered two arguments to support his contention 
that school officials violated the concept of neutrality because 
"[t]he Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise .... "59 
First, he pointed to the pervasive role that school officials played 
in deciding to have prayer, inviting religious leaders to pray, 
and offering guidelines under which the prayer was composed. 
The second factor that Kennedy identified as contributing to 
coerciveness was that students were truly not free to absent 
themselves from their graduations.60 
After voicing an apparently unfounded concern over the 
potential divisiveness of prayer in the community, Kennedy 
reflected on the role of civic religion. He initially seemed to sug-
gest the need for a civic religion founded in a "common 
ground ... express[ing] the shared conviction that there is an 
ethic and a morality which transcend[s] human invention, the 
sense of community and purpose sought by all decent societ-
ies."61 Even so, he quickly concluded that "[t]he suggestion that 
government may establish an official or civic religion as a means 
of avoiding the establishment of a religion with a more specific 
creed strikes us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted."62 
58. ld. at 577. 
59. ld. 
60. Later in his opinion Kennedy discussed what he perceived as the psychological 
and social pressures that students faced by having to maintain a respectful silence 
during an invocation or benediction that they may not have agreed with. Id. at 593-594. 
61. Id. at 589. 
62. Id. at 590. 
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Turning to the relationship between the Free Speech and 
Establishment Clauses, Kennedy focused on what he perceived 
as the "different mechanisms"63 by which these rights are pro-
tected. He probably would have been better served by using an 
expression such as "different emphases" because free speech "is 
protected by ensuring its full expression even when the govern-
ment participates, for the very object of some of our most impor-
tant speech is to persuade the government to adopt an idea as 
its own."64 Yet, when dealing with religious expression, the gov-
ernment is not supposed to be a prime participant. The govern-
ment oversteps its bounds when it "disavows its own duty to 
guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief 
which is the mark of a free people."65 The key factors, then, that 
Kennedy went on to consider in placing different emphases be-
tween free speech and establishment clauses were psychology 
and peer pressure of social conformity, the de minimis character 
of graduation prayers, and the potential forfeiture of the benefit 
of attending graduation that students would suffer if they chose 
not to attend the ceremony. 66 
Justice Scalia's scathing dissent disagreed with Justice Ken-
nedy in four major ways. First, he stridently asserted that the 
Court went "beyond the realm where judges know what they are 
doing. The Court's argument that state officials have 'coerced' 
students to take part in the invocation and benediction ceremo-
nies is, not to put too fine a point on it, incoherent."67 Scalia 
further reasoned that the silence on the part of students did not 
have to be interpreted as their assent to the prayer. In fact, his 
eloquent comment "that maintaining respect for the religious 
observances of others is a fundamental civic virtue that govern-
ment (including the public schools) can and should cultivate"68 
63. Id. at 591. 
64. Id. 
65. ld. at 592. 
66. ld. at 593 passim. 
67. Id. at 636. Justice Scalia issued what has to be one of the more blistering 
dissents in recent memory. Just prior to this remark he wrote that "I find it a sufficient 
embarrassment that our Establishment Clause jurisprudence regarding holiday displays, 
has come to 'require scrutiny more commonly associated with interior decorators than 
the judiciary.' But interior decorating is a rock-hard science compared to psychology 
practiced by amateurs." (Internal citations omitted). 
68. Id. at 638. 
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offered an unanswered challenge to the Court to consider how 
people must come together in a pluralistic society. 
Scalia's second point of disagreement was based on his posi-
tion that the acts of school officials in inviting clergy to pray did 
not amount to state endorsement. Third, he criticized the histor-
ical analyses of Justice Kennedy's majority and Justice Souter's 
concurrence. Scalia pointed out that unlike the time when the 
Establishment Clause was adopted, and civil penalties could be 
imposed for failing to comply with state-sanctioned religious 
requirements, no such penalties were at issue. Finally, Scalia 
distinguished Engel69 and Schempp70 on the basis that atten-
dance in class, unlike at a public graduation ceremony, is com-
pulsory, rather than optional, and parents are excluded from the 
former but invited to the latter. 
C. POST-LEE LITIGATION 
On the same day that the Court struck down Lee, it vacated, 
and remanded without comment, Jones u. Clear Creek Independ-
ent School District,71 a case from Texas with a similar set of 
facts. The major difference between the suits was that in Jones, 
members of a high school's senior class chose volunteers to de-
liver nonsectarian, nonproselytizing prayers at their graduation. 
On remand to the Fifth Circuit,72 that court placed greater 
reliance on Justice Scalia's dissent than the majority opinion in 
Lee. More specifically, the Fifth Circuit narrowly interpreted Lee 
as precluding only those prayers that were school-sponsored. As 
such, the Fifth Circuit declared that since the students, not the 
school officials, invited individuals to lead the prayers, they 
were constitutional. Subsequently, the Supreme Court refused 
to hear an appeal in Jones. 73 Even though the Court's denial of 
certiorari in Jones is of no precedential value, educators in the 
Fifth Circuie4 may permit student-initiated prayer at public 
69. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). 
70. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). 
71. 930 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. granted, vacated, and remanded, 505 U.S. 
1215 (1992). 
72. 977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, 983 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1992). 
73. Cert. denied, 508 U.S. 967 (1993). 
74. But see Ingbretsen v. Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996). 
cert. denied sub nom. Moore v. Ingebretsen, _U.S._, 117 S. Ct. 388 (1996J (invalidating 
a law in Mississippi that allowed "students to initiate nonsectarian, nonproselylizing 
prayer at various compulsory and noncompulsory school events"). See also Herdahl v. 
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graduation ceremonies. In the interim, four other Circuits75 
have, with mixed results, addressed prayer at graduations.76 
At issue in Harris u. Joint School District No. 241, a dispute 
from Idaho, was whether administrators could permit high 
school students to choose, by a majority vote, whether to have 
prayer at a nonmandatory graduation ceremony.77 After a fed-
eral trial court ruled that prayer did not violate the Establish-
ment Clause, the Ninth Circuit reversed on the basis that since 
school officials still ultimately controlled the ceremony, they 
could not permit students to decide whether to have public 
prayer at graduation. 78 The Supreme Court sidestepped the 
controversy by vacating the judgment as moot and remanding 
with instructions to dismiss, apparently since the students had 
graduated. 79 
In American Civil Liberties Union of New Jersey u. Black 
Horse Pike Regional Board of Education, 80 an en bane panel of 
the Third Circuit followed the lead of Harris and affirmed that a 
board policy of permitting student-led prayer at a public high 
school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause. 
Pontotoc County Sch. Dist., 933 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Miss. 1996) (prohibiting a religious 
club from making announcements including prayers and Bible readings over a school 
wide intercom system; however, the court did permit student-initiated prayer before 
school to continue). 
75. In addition, a federal trial court in Virginia, in a case that was not appealed 
to the Fourth Circuit, ruled that allowing high school students to decide whether to 
include prayer in a graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause since state 
sponsorship was inherent in the activity. Gearon v. Loudoun County Sch. Bd., 844 F. 
Supp. 1097 <E.D. Va. 1993). 
76. At least two lower courts have recently examined the propriety of student-
initiated prayer at school activities other than graduations. See Chandler v. James, 958 
F. Supp. 1550 (M.D. Ala 1997), 998 F. Supp 1255 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (permanently 
enjoining a state law that allowed student-initiated, nonsectarian voluntary prayer as 
school-related events); Committee for Voluntary Prayer v. Wimberly, 704 A.2d 1199 
(D.C. 1997) (holding that a proposed initiative on non-sectarian, non-proselytizing, 
student initiated prayer at school related activities was not a proper subject within the 
meaning of voter-initiated measures); For an earlier post-Lee case involving school-
sponsored prayer, see Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 986 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1993), 
opinion withdrawn and superseded, 994 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1993) (prohibiting school 
employees from initiating and leading students in prayer before and after athletic 
practices and competitions). 
77. 41 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1994). 
78. Harris v. Joint Sch. Dist. No. 241, 821 F. Supp. 638 (D. Idaho 1993). 
79. Cert. granted, and judgment vacated with directions to dismiss as moot, 515 
u.s. 1154 (1995). 
80. 84 F.3d 1471 (3rd Cir. 1996); (the court reached its decision by a nine-to-four 
margin.) 
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The majority held that since the board retained significant au-
thority over the ceremony, prayer could not be upheld as pro-
moting the free speech rights of students. 
When graduating students and their parents in Florida chal-
lenged a board's policy of permitting prayer at a commencement 
ceremony, the Eleventh Circuit, in Adler v. Duval County School 
Board,81 affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
board. In not reviewing the merits of the trial judge's constitu-
tional analysis, the court, in a manner not unlike Jones, was 
satisfied that the students' claims for relief were moot because 
they had already graduated. 
The most recent disagreement over graduation prayer arose 
in Idaho. In Doe v. Madison School District No. 321,82 the Ninth 
Circuit upheld a board policy of allowing each of a minimum of 
four graduating students to offer "an address, poem, reading, 
song, musical presentation, prayer, or any other presentation" at 
their commencement.83 The court reasoned that the policy was 
acceptable because the students and not the clergy delivered the 
prayer; the speakers were selected on the basis of their academic 
standing; and school officials did not "'censor any presentation 
or require any content.' At most, [they] 'advise[dl the partici-
pants about the appropriate language for the audience and occa-
sion.' "84 The court drew a clear line between Madison and Lee, 
finding that the policy was acceptable because it easily satisfied 
all three prongs of the Lemon test. Based on the Ninth Circuit's 
careful distinction, it appears that Madison is not the case that 
will make its way to the Supreme Court to resolve the split over 
prayer. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
When considering the parameters under which prayer at 
public school graduation ceremonies may be constitutionally 
permissible,85 there are two larger, more important issues that 
81. 112 F.3d 1475 (11th Cir. 1997). 
82. 147 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 1998). 
83. !d. at 834. 
84. !d. 
85. For apparently the only recorded post-Lee case involving the frequently related 
matter of baccalaureate services, see Shumway v. Albany County Sch. Dist. No. 11, 826 
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may transform prayer from a potentially contentious exercise in 
futility to a teachable moment that can unite communities. The 
way in which the Court clarifies the constitutional place of 
prayer, if any, at public school graduation ceremonies will have 
a major impact on the United States as the nation heads into 
the new millennium. The resolution of the place of prayer at 
graduation ceremonies is important because the way in which 
this debate is played out will reveal whether the nation still 
cherishes the underlying values of freedom of religion and 
speech that contributed so greatly to its foundation. 
The first question concerns the paradox of how a democratic 
society that was founded on religious principles but continues to 
preserve the Jeffersonian metaphor by maintaining "a wall of 
separation" between church and state with regard to prayer at 
public school graduations, can respect the rights of both the 
majority and minority. In other words, while a majority of Amer-
icans seems to favor prayer at school graduations, it is impor-
tant to safeguard the rights of the minority.86 At the same time, 
in protecting the rights of the minority by banning prayer, it 
F. Supp. 1320 (D. Wyo.) (holding that a school board violated the First Amendment 
rights of a group of students and parents when it refused to rent them a school 
gymnasium to conduct a privately sponsored baccalaureate service that would have been 
open to the public and all students who wished to participate). For the two pre·Lee 
cases, see Verbena United Methodist Church v. Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 765 F. 
Supp. 704 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (ordering a board to rent an auditorium to a local church 
that sought to conduct a baccalaureate service); Randall v. Pagan, 765 F. Supp. 793 
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (denying a preliminary injunction to a graduating senior and a parent 
that would have prevented a district from leasing a high school auditorium to a 
nondenominational student group that wished to conduct a baccalaureate ceremony). 
86. In the most recent edition of the Phi Delta Kappa/Gallup Poll assessing 
attitudes toward public school, the majority favored prayer. The same question, which 
had been posed previously in 1995 and 1985, reads: "An amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution has been proposed that would permit prayers to be spoken in public 
schools. Do you favor or oppose this amendment?" 67% of respondents answered yes 
(down from 71% in 1995 and up from 69% in 1985); 28% (up from 25% and 24% 
respectively) answered no; 5% answered don't know (up from 4% and down from 7%). 
More specifically, 73% of parents with children in public schools responded affirmatively 
(down from 75% and no change from 73%); 22% (up from 20% and 21% respectively) 
answered that they opposed the amendment; 5% (the same as last time and down from 
6% respectively answered don't know. Lowell C. Rose & Alec M. Gallup, The 30th 
Annual Phi Delta Kappa/ Gallup Poll Of the Public's Attitudes Toward the Public 
Schools, 80 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 41, 50 (1998). Even in the face of such strong support, 
the House of Representatives recently passed, by a 224-203 vote, a bill that sought to 
enact an amendment supporting school prayer. However, the bill fell 61 votes short of 
the two-thirds necessary to pass a constitutional amendment. Katherine Q. Seelye, 
House Rejects School Prayer Amendment to Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1998 at 
A 13. 
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remains to be seen how the courts can avoid the tyranny of the 
minority. 87 Therefore, finding an acceptable middle ground is 
essential. 
If Justice Kennedy's concern about "mutuality of obliga-
tion"88 in Lee is to have any genuine meaning, then the State, 
qua public schools, must find a way to accommodate the view-
points of all, rather than stifle the religious expression of believ-
ers. To this end, Justice Scalia's insight "that maintaining re-
spect for the religious observances of others is a fundamental 
civic virtue that government (including the public schools) can 
and should cultivate"89 is crucial. 
One can only wonder how educators can expect to foster an 
appreciation of diversity in all of its manifestations if we cannot 
tolerate expressions of religious or other beliefs that may not be 
shared by all members of an audience or community. It is ironic 
that in a nation that values freedom of religion, the courts have 
been unable to reach a consensus on the appropriateness of 
prayer at graduations. The judicial inability to formulate a mea-
sure that respects the rights of diverse groups is frustrating 
where educators have, as in Lee, included well-reasoned safe-
guards such as selecting a religious leader from a different faith 
each year and providing broad-based guidelines under which 
prayers may be offered. The Lee Court's failure to respond ade-
quately to Justice Scalia's salient observation that silence does 
not necessarily mean assent has further exacerbated the situa-
tion. By silently listening to and reflecting upon whatever 
prayer is being offered, members of an audience can develop a 
deeper respect for perspectives other than their own. Moreover, 
if the United States is to continue to grow as a nation, it is not 
only unnecessary but is potentially very dangerous to limit the 
parameters of civil discourse on controversial issues such as 
prayer. 
A second and closely related question arises in light of the 
effect prong in Lemon. More specifically, if the Nation is to con-
tinue to foster on-going dialogue about diversity of perspectives, 
87. For an interesting case, see Bauchman v. West High Sch., 132 F.3d 542 (lOth 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, _U.S._, 118 S. Ct. 2370 (1998) (affirming that a student failed 
to state a claim for a violation of the Establishment Clause where a music director 
used explicitly Christian music at a public school graduation ceremony). 
88. Lee v. Weisman, supra, note 49, at 591. 
89. !d. at 638. 
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it is imperative that the Court provide guidance for the remain-
der of the federal judiciary to avoid the appearance of inhibiting 
religion, especially in the aftermath of recent cases that have 
been less than favorable to expressions of religious belief.90 
Lip service over the importance of respect for differences of 
opinion aside, the courts must allow the schools to practice what 
they preach and do more than talk about inculcating different 
values. At a time when morals and values are center stage in 
public debate, one can only wonder what message school chil-
dren receive when the courts have ensured that their educations 
are virtually sanitized of references to prayer and religion91 
other than "appropriate" discussions in history or English 
classes.92 By imposing a wall of silence that prevents believers 
from exercising their constitutional rights, schools and the 
90. See, e.g., Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (lOth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 
505 U.S. 1218 (1992) (preventing a teacher from reading the Bible during class time 
and requiring them to removeremoving The Bible in Pictures and The Story of Jesus 
from his classroom library, while books on Greek gods and goddesses and American 
Indian religions remainedremain on the shelves); Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Pub. 
Schs., 33 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1095 (1995) (upholding the 
removal of a portrait of Christ, painted by a graduate of the school, that had been 
posted on the wall of a public high school for thirty years); and C.H. v. Oliva, 990 F. 
Supp. 341 (]).N.J. 1997) (holding that a board of education did not violate the First 
Amendment rights of a first grade student when school officials changed the location 
of his poster of Jesus and prevented him from reading Bible stories to his classmates). 
91. In a controversy from New York City that received national attention, a 
substitute teacher in a public school lost her job when she asked sixth graders if they 
were willing to accept Jesus as their personal Savior and wanted to pray as the class 
discussed the recent drowning death of one of their classmates. Jacques Steinberg & 
Macarena Hernandez, Teacher is Now Political Cause After Dismissal for Class Prayer, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1998 at B 1. In an interesting twist, even while the teacher's 
wrongful termination suit was pending against the school board, it awarded her two 
weeks of back pay. New Your Teacher Who Led Students in Prayer Awarded Back Pay, 
MANAGING SCHOOL BUSINESS In an interesting twist, even while the teacher's wrongful 
termination suit was pending against the school board, it awarded her two weeks of 
back pay. New York Teacher Who Led Students in Prayer Awarded Back Pay, 
MANAGING SCHOOL BUSINESS, Vol. 3, Issue 14, September 24, 1998, at 9., Vol. 3, Issue 
14, September 24, 1998, at 9. 
92. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 435, n. 21 (1962). The Court wrote: 
There is, of course, nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent 
with the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express 
love for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of 
Independence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially 
espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a 
Supreme Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations in our 
public life of belief in God. 
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courts risk sending out the unmistakable message to children 
that freedom of religion is little more than a pious platitude.93 
The third not entirely unrelated question relates to the na-
ture of the prayers themselves. Does the nation risk trivializing 
the profound relationship between believers and their God about 
the nature of the "prayers" at graduations? Could it be that 
these "prayers" run the risk of being reduced to mere formali-
ties, words uttered to bring a gathering to order? If this is the 
case, then could a selection from a book of poetry, or even the 
phone book, have the same effect if we fear "coercing" listeners 
by "forcing" them to maintain silence? 
In other words, if one views prayer as being, in some way, 
shape, or form, a type of communication with, or, a lifting ofthe 
heart and mind to God, then are not these discussions on prayer 
at graduations a variation on the theme of reduction to the ab-
surd? Is it fair to say that a few brief words from scriptures, 
whether Jewish, Christian, Islamic, or Buddhist, among many 
others, run the risk of "establishing" a state religion? Or does 
the erection of a wall of separation almost run the risk of mock-
ing believers while turning them into second class citizens? By 
relegating prayer to a kind of afterthought, the courts and 
schools may be setting a precedent that undermines the very 
foundation upon which the nation was established. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As controversy over the constitutionality of prayer lingers 
on, a line of Supreme Court precedent from Engel v. Vitale to Lee 
v. Weisman clearly prohibits officials in the public schools from 
sponsoring prayer or other religious activities at school spon-
sored graduation ceremonies (or other activities such as athletic 
contests). Yet, the place, if any, of prayer at graduation ceremo-
nies remains unsettled in light of the Court's action, or lack 
thereof, subsequent to its initial ruling in Jones v. Clear Creek 
Independent School District. The Fifth Circuit's decision to adopt 
the reasoning in Justice Scalia's dissent and permit student-
initiated prayer at graduations, followed by the High Court's 
93. This is not to suggest that the schools should replace parents in teaching 
values to children. Rather, the purpose of this discussion is to raise the question of the 
confusion that undoubtedly exists in the minds of children whose parents value religion 
and who then enter a school system that transmits an almost antithetical perspective. 
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denial of certiorari, although of no precedential value outside of 
the Fifth Circuit, meant that the question remained alive. In 
fact, the ensuing split between the circuits over the constitution-
ality of prayer at public school graduation ceremonies virtually 
ensures that this highly contentious question will eventually 
find its way back to the Court. 
If anything, the ongoing public discourse over the place of 
prayer and other forms of religious expression in American pub-
lic schools generally, or at graduation ceremonies in particular, 
let alone other dimensions of public life,94 is a revealing barome-
ter of how deeply conflicted American attitudes are in this re-
gard. As the Nation grows increasingly pluralistic and multicul-
tural groups that have previously been marginalized move into 
the mainstream, new and novel issues involving the place of 
religion in the schools will arise. 95 Perhaps a case raised by one 
of these groups that formerly have been disenfranchised will 
serve as the spur that energizes the Court to reevaluate its 
stance. At the same time, it is important to recognize that the 
Court does not run the risk of establishing a state-sponsored 
religion by permitting prayer at public school graduation cere-
monies. Rather, by acknowledging the legitimate place of prayer 
at graduation ceremonies in the public schools, the Court can 
assume a leadership role in truly fostering a climate wherein 
diversity of opinions and beliefs are not only appreciated but are 
also celebrated by all Americans. 
94. For a recent non-school case involving religion, see Capitol Square Review and 
Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (upholding the right of the Ohio Knights 
of the Ku Klux Klan to erect a large cross on the square in front of the state capitol). 
For a discussion of this case in the broader context, see David L. Gregory & Charles J. 
Russo, The Supreme Court's Jurisprudence of Religious Symbol and Substance, 28 LOY. 
U. CHI. L. J. 419 (1997). 
95. For a case involving a new group, see Cheema v. Thompson, 67 F.3d 883 (9th 
Cir. 1995) (affirming that a district's total ban on weapons violated the religious rights 
of Khalsa Sikh students who wished to wear their kirpans, or ceremonial daggers, to 
school). 
